sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS

Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those.  Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.

Change-Id: I3b5b01ea1c13326d873faa17b2edcadf4c77eb94
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CVE-2016-10088
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
This commit is contained in:
Al Viro
2019-08-06 11:48:20 +02:00
committed by Francescodario Cuzzocrea
parent fe9a416d73
commit af89150adf
2 changed files with 6 additions and 0 deletions
+3
View File
@@ -675,6 +675,9 @@ bsg_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
dprintk("%s: write %Zd bytes\n", bd->name, count);
if (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)))
return -EINVAL;
bsg_set_block(bd, file);
bytes_written = 0;
+3
View File
@@ -547,6 +547,9 @@ sg_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos)
sg_io_hdr_t *hp;
unsigned char cmnd[MAX_COMMAND_SIZE];
if (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)))
return -EINVAL;
if ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)) || (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp)))
return -ENXIO;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, printk("sg_write: %s, count=%d\n",