This patch removes mm->mmap_sem from mm->exe_file read side.
Also it kills dup_mm_exe_file() and moves exe_file duplication into
dup_mmap() where both mmap_sems are locked.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment typo]
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[haggertk: Backport to 3.4; __fget() in fs/file.c not applicable]
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Change-Id: I7fbc5b638f9ac9e74cd9adfdfb92c81e1146080c
TCP Appropriate Byte Count was added by me, but later disabled.
There is no point in maintaining it since it is a potential source
of bugs and Linux already implements other better window protection
heuristics.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Change-Id: Ifc93fa043256c275580a9f93611ad1d013889bc4
Thanks to Michael Kerrisk for keeping us honest. These flags are actually
useful for eliminating the only case where kmod has to mangle a module's
internals: for overriding module versioning.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Acked-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
(backported from Rusty's modules-next tree)
BUG=None, keeping us in sync with upstream for this API
TEST=daisy build, manual testing
CQ-DEPEND=I5b5a9bee3f9e73eb076f01e8aacee51eff095c56
Change-Id: I40f0b55ff903dda411a04b088f4ca5b6ab5cf05e
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/37278
Reviewed-by: Mandeep Singh Baines <msb@chromium.org>
Instead of (or in addition to) kernel module signing, being able to reason
about the origin of a kernel module would be valuable in situations
where an OS already trusts a specific file system, file, etc, due to
things like security labels or an existing root of trust to a partition
through things like dm-verity.
This introduces a new syscall (currently only on x86), similar to
init_module, that has only two arguments. The first argument is used as
a file descriptor to the module and the second argument is a pointer to
the NULL terminated string of module arguments.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[accepted into Rusty's modules-wip tree for linux-next:
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/modules-wip]
BUG=chromium-os:34134
TEST=parrot build, manual testing
Change-Id: I51122d61d0085ed40d2ac9b542646b28d066d5e3
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/34302
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olof Johansson <olofj@chromium.org>
Commit-Ready: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
If an unprivileged user has the appropriate capabilities in their
current user namespace allow the creation of new namespaces.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Change-Id: Ic3bdabc878944a7f3da0f3293d7163f051e65c34
- Push the permission check from the core setns syscall into
the setns install methods where the user namespace of the
target namespace can be determined, and used in a ns_capable
call.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Change-Id: I655fbd54531112ae7fe425a4055c2583a41deb78
memfd_create() is similar to mmap(MAP_ANON), but returns a file-descriptor
that you can pass to mmap(). It can support sealing and avoids any
connection to user-visible mount-points. Thus, it's not subject to quotas
on mounted file-systems, but can be used like malloc()'ed memory, but with
a file-descriptor to it.
memfd_create() returns the raw shmem file, so calls like ftruncate() can
be used to modify the underlying inode. Also calls like fstat() will
return proper information and mark the file as regular file. If you want
sealing, you can specify MFD_ALLOW_SEALING. Otherwise, sealing is not
supported (like on all other regular files).
Compared to O_TMPFILE, it does not require a tmpfs mount-point and is not
subject to a filesystem size limit. It is still properly accounted to
memcg limits, though, and to the same overcommit or no-overcommit
accounting as all user memory.
Change-Id: Id7f5dc15f3dcca8e0e8e5d9aea4a9b53cad6a769
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch (of 6):
The i_mmap_writable field counts existing writable mappings of an
address_space. To allow drivers to prevent new writable mappings, make
this counter signed and prevent new writable mappings if it is negative.
This is modelled after i_writecount and DENYWRITE.
This will be required by the shmem-sealing infrastructure to prevent any
new writable mappings after the WRITE seal has been set. In case there
exists a writable mapping, this operation will fail with EBUSY.
Note that we rely on the fact that iff you already own a writable mapping,
you can increase the counter without using the helpers. This is the same
that we do for i_writecount.
Change-Id: Id16c5b650e451956a4f6df004483cb63197c613c
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
commit 500ad2d8b01390c98bc6dce068bccfa9534b8212 upstream.
While debugging a warning message on PowerPC while using hardware
breakpoints, it was discovered that when perf_event_disable is invoked
through hw_breakpoint_handler function with interrupts disabled, a
subsequent IPI in the code path would trigger a WARN_ON_ONCE message in
smp_call_function_single function.
This patch calls __perf_event_disable() when interrupts are already
disabled, instead of perf_event_disable().
Reported-by: Edjunior Barbosa Machado <emachado@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: K.Prasad <Prasad.Krishnan@gmail.com>
[naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com: v3: Check to make sure we target current task]
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120802081635.5811.17737.stgit@localhost.localdomain
[ Fixed build error on MIPS. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Change-Id: I4ed3bb0ff5c41d633868d488aaff14897e56e973
This heavily decreases the timout value for stopping a process.
Therefore it enters deep-sleep much quicker which saves more battery.
Change-Id: I7e3c9f8d62354324b40a70aa1b999c0897ea0436
commit 5f936e19cc0ef97dbe3a56e9498922ad5ba1edef upstream.
Air Icy reported:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/time/alarmtimer.c:811:7
signed integer overflow:
1529859276030040771 + 9223372036854775807 cannot be represented in type 'long long int'
Call Trace:
alarm_timer_nsleep+0x44c/0x510 kernel/time/alarmtimer.c:811
__do_sys_clock_nanosleep kernel/time/posix-timers.c:1235 [inline]
__se_sys_clock_nanosleep kernel/time/posix-timers.c:1213 [inline]
__x64_sys_clock_nanosleep+0x326/0x4e0 kernel/time/posix-timers.c:1213
do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x3a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
alarm_timer_nsleep() uses ktime_add() to add the current time and the
relative expiry value. ktime_add() has no sanity checks so the addition
can overflow when the relative timeout is large enough.
Use ktime_add_safe() which has the necessary sanity checks in place and
limits the result to the valid range.
Fixes: 9a7adcf5c6 ("timers: Posix interface for alarm-timers")
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1807020926360.1595@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Change-Id: I00ed8e38ea6298a086849e2fc9fee46f3e6bd5d1
CVE-2018-13053
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Based on the public grsecurity patches.
Change-Id: I2cbea91b351cda7d098f4e1aa73dff1acbd23cce
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit 51d7b120418e99d6b3bf8df9eb3cc31e8171dee4 upstream.
In commit c4004b02f8e5b ("x86: remove the kernel code/data/bss resources
from /proc/iomem") I was hoping to remove the phyiscal kernel address
data from /proc/iomem entirely, but that had to be reverted because some
system programs actually use it.
This limits all the detailed resource information to properly
credentialed users instead.
Bug: 117422211
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: Ia829ad3659bd36b959ee5f446dca53c5aa4d5654
[haggertk: Backported to 3.4
- Use capable() instead of file_ns_capable()]
CVE-2019-2001
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
* Guards of sec_debug.h include removed in those files that call
functions declared in that header. The header defines empty
functions when CONFIG_SEC_DEBUG is not defined.
* Expose extern declaration of sec_class in qpnp-power-on.c when
CONFIG_SEC_DEBUG is not defined.
* Guard debug level sysfs tuneables.
Change-Id: I4e8b1ae7dd1dce0dec5434da64832165b2659aff
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit 48fb6f4db940e92cfb16cd878cddd59ea6120d06 upstream.
Commit 65d8fc777f6d ("futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in
get_futex_key()") removed an unnecessary lock_page() with the
side-effect that page->mapping needed to be treated very carefully.
Two defensive warnings were added in case any assumption was missed and
the first warning assumed a correct application would not alter a
mapping backing a futex key. Since merging, it has not triggered for
any unexpected case but Mark Rutland reported the following bug
triggering due to the first warning.
kernel BUG at kernel/futex.c:679!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3695 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc3-00020-g307fec773ba3 #3
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
task: ffff80001e271780 task.stack: ffff000010908000
PC is at get_futex_key+0x6a4/0xcf0 kernel/futex.c:679
LR is at get_futex_key+0x6a4/0xcf0 kernel/futex.c:679
pc : [<ffff00000821ac14>] lr : [<ffff00000821ac14>] pstate: 80000145
The fact that it's a bug instead of a warning was due to an unrelated
arm64 problem, but the warning itself triggered because the underlying
mapping changed.
This is an application issue but from a kernel perspective it's a
recoverable situation and the warning is unnecessary so this patch
removes the warning. The warning may potentially be triggered with the
following test program from Mark although it may be necessary to adjust
NR_FUTEX_THREADS to be a value smaller than the number of CPUs in the
system.
#include <linux/futex.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define NR_FUTEX_THREADS 16
pthread_t threads[NR_FUTEX_THREADS];
void *mem;
#define MEM_PROT (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE)
#define MEM_SIZE 65536
static int futex_wrapper(int *uaddr, int op, int val,
const struct timespec *timeout,
int *uaddr2, int val3)
{
syscall(SYS_futex, uaddr, op, val, timeout, uaddr2, val3);
}
void *poll_futex(void *unused)
{
for (;;) {
futex_wrapper(mem, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI, 1, NULL, mem + 4, 1);
}
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int i;
mem = mmap(NULL, MEM_SIZE, MEM_PROT,
MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
printf("Mapping @ %p\n", mem);
printf("Creating futex threads...\n");
for (i = 0; i < NR_FUTEX_THREADS; i++)
pthread_create(&threads[i], NULL, poll_futex, NULL);
printf("Flipping mapping...\n");
for (;;) {
mmap(mem, MEM_SIZE, MEM_PROT,
MAP_FIXED | MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
}
return 0;
}
Change-Id: I52f642cfcd3e109e6d69bdb1ca17950e6e251dfc
Reported-and-tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.7+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit 65d8fc777f6dcfee12785c057a6b57f679641c90 upstream.
When dealing with key handling for shared futexes, we can drastically reduce
the usage/need of the page lock. 1) For anonymous pages, the associated futex
object is the mm_struct which does not require the page lock. 2) For inode
based, keys, we can check under RCU read lock if the page mapping is still
valid and take reference to the inode. This just leaves one rare race that
requires the page lock in the slow path when examining the swapcache.
Additionally realtime users currently have a problem with the page lock being
contended for unbounded periods of time during futex operations.
Task A
get_futex_key()
lock_page()
---> preempted
Now any other task trying to lock that page will have to wait until
task A gets scheduled back in, which is an unbound time.
With this patch, we pretty much have a lockless futex_get_key().
Experiments show that this patch can boost/speedup the hashing of shared
futexes with the perf futex benchmarks (which is good for measuring such
change) by up to 45% when there are high (> 100) thread counts on a 60 core
Westmere. Lower counts are pretty much in the noise range or less than 10%,
but mid range can be seen at over 30% overall throughput (hash ops/sec).
This makes anon-mem shared futexes much closer to its private counterpart.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
[ Ported on top of thp refcount rework, changelog, comments, fixes. ]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455045314-8305-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bug: 74250718
Change-Id: I80e300aa740a553fbbbf84143d6a4165f31c8a90
Signed-off-by: David Lin <dtwlin@google.com>
[haggertk: Backport to 3.4/msm8974. Replace READ_ONCE with
ACCESS_ONCE. And other minor things.]
CVE-2018-9422
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
The user namespace which creates a new network namespace owns that
namespace and all resources created in it. This way we can target
capability checks for privileged operations against network resources to
the user_ns which created the network namespace in which the resource
lives. Privilege to the user namespace which owns the network
namespace, or any parent user namespace thereof, provides the same
privilege to the network resource.
This patch is reworked from a version originally by
Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Change-Id: Ifa426537c47cce669099cc96e80b17e1d814457b
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Start distinguishing between internal kernel uids and gids and
values that userspace can use. This is done by introducing two
new types: kuid_t and kgid_t. These types and their associated
functions are infrastructure are declared in the new header
uidgid.h.
Ultimately there will be a different implementation of the mapping
functions for use with user namespaces. But to keep it simple
we introduce the mapping functions first to separate the meat
from the mechanical code conversions.
Export overflowuid and overflowgid so we can use from_kuid_munged
and from_kgid_munged in modular code.
Change-Id: Id934f981c91aa9c656e045d4f45f958c7fc2f1b0
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Prevent use of uninitialized memory (originating from the stack frame of
do_sysctl()) by verifying that the name array is filled with sufficient
input data before comparing its specific entries with integer constants.
Through timing measurement or analyzing the kernel debug logs, a
user-mode program could potentially infer the results of comparisons
against the uninitialized memory, and acquire some (very limited)
information about the state of the kernel stack. The change also
eliminates possible future warnings by tools such as KMSAN and other
code checkers / instrumentations.
Change-Id: I44af72c8ffe080593a0f2cd88b3a1c93fb661e07
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524122139.21333-1-mjurczyk@google.com
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Matthew Whitehead <tedheadster@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Add the rtc irq support for alarmtimer to wakeup the
alarm during system suspend.
Change-Id: I41b774ed4e788359321e1c6a564551cc9cd40c8e
Signed-off-by: Xiaocheng Li <lix@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Now that alarmtimer_remove has been simplified, change
its name to _dequeue to better match its paired _enqueue
function.
Change-Id: I234362798c5eb8a1f357758e40cbc794b77e2061
Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
* The comment says this case isn't supposed to be here for H-projects,
variables it depends on are ifndef-ed out for H-projects, just get rid
of it.
Change-Id: Ic67a1e97c4429dd5cf4df9e2f45fb63d13e4054f
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit 321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290 upstream.
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Change-Id: I83d360303e812232ae7aae492350813f0e79cc71
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Use ACCESS_ONCE() instead of READ_ONCE()
- Test perf_event::group_flags instead of group_caps
- Add the err_locked cleanup block, which we didn't need before
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CVE-2017-6001
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
This reverts commit f0ce0eee6b71bc310153edb87e66e6b25e12fece.
Bug: 34951864
Bug: 36468447
Change-Id: I87bd92e096c6c28a53b9ecf302ae008f5e58eba1
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
CVE-2017-0710
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
(Cherry picked from commit 59643d1535eb220668692a5359de22545af579f6)
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Change-Id: I1147672317a3ad0fc995b1f32baaa050a7976ac4
Bug: 32659848
CVE-2016-9754
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b)
Bug: 30955111
Bug: 31095224
Change-Id: I5bab713034e960fad467637e98e914440de5666d
CVE-2016-6786
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Change-Id: I2d399c60767daa63833c49008a162b7af248857b
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CVE-2015-8963
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
all callers want the same thing, actually - a kinda-sorta analog of
kern_path_create(). I.e. they want parent vfsmount/dentry (with
->i_mutex held, to make sure the child dentry is still their child)
+ the child dentry.
Signed-off-by Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Change-Id: I58cc7b0a087646516db9af69962447d27fb3ee8b
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
copy_tree() can theoretically fail in a case other than ENOMEM, but always
returns NULL which is interpreted by callers as -ENOMEM. Change it to return
an explicit error.
Also change clone_mnt() for consistency and because union mounts will add new
error cases.
Thanks to Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> for a bug fix.
[AV: folded braino fix by Dan Carpenter]
Original-author: Valerie Aurora <vaurora@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Valerie Aurora <valerie.aurora@gmail.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
(cherry picked from commit be34d1a3bc4b6f357a49acb55ae870c81337e4f0)
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Change-Id: I82a041ca6b52cf3d8a255d1733a5deeafce80625
lglocks and brlocks are currently generated with some complicated macros
in lglock.h. But there's no reason to not just use common utility
functions and put all the data into a common data structure.
Since there are at least two users it makes sense to share this code in a
library. This is also easier maintainable than a macro forest.
This will also make it later possible to dynamically allocate lglocks and
also use them in modules (this would both still need some additional, but
now straightforward, code)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
(cherry picked from commit eea62f831b8030b0eeea8314eed73b6132d1de26)
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Change-Id: I15bcd04933c537e8c5c44c6b44e411a0318f1ca3
(cherry pick from commit 73af963f9f3036dffed55c3a2898598186db1045)
__ptrace_may_access() checks get_dumpable/ptrace_has_cap/etc if task !=
current, this can can lead to surprising results.
For example, a sub-thread can't readlink("/proc/self/exe") if the
executable is not readable. setup_new_exec()->would_dump() notices that
inode_permission(MAY_READ) fails and then it does
set_dumpable(suid_dumpable). After that get_dumpable() fails.
(It is not clear why proc_pid_readlink() checks get_dumpable(), perhaps we
could add PTRACE_MODE_NODUMPABLE)
Change __ptrace_may_access() to use same_thread_group() instead of "task
== current". Any security check is pointless when the tasks share the
same ->mm.
Signed-off-by: Mark Grondona <mgrondona@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Ben Woodard <woodard@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 26016905
Change-Id: If9e2a0eb3339d26d50a9d84671a189fe405f36a3
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
The following method of CPU hotplug callback registration is not safe
due to the possibility of an ABBA deadlock involving the cpu_add_remove_lock
and the cpu_hotplug.lock.
get_online_cpus();
for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
init_cpu(cpu);
register_cpu_notifier(&foobar_cpu_notifier);
put_online_cpus();
The deadlock is shown below:
CPU 0 CPU 1
----- -----
Acquire cpu_hotplug.lock
[via get_online_cpus()]
CPU online/offline operation
takes cpu_add_remove_lock
[via cpu_maps_update_begin()]
Try to acquire
cpu_add_remove_lock
[via register_cpu_notifier()]
CPU online/offline operation
tries to acquire cpu_hotplug.lock
[via cpu_hotplug_begin()]
*** DEADLOCK! ***
The problem here is that callback registration takes the locks in one order
whereas the CPU hotplug operations take the same locks in the opposite order.
To avoid this issue and to provide a race-free method to register CPU hotplug
callbacks (along with initialization of already online CPUs), introduce new
variants of the callback registration APIs that simply register the callbacks
without holding the cpu_add_remove_lock during the registration. That way,
we can avoid the ABBA scenario. However, we will need to hold the
cpu_add_remove_lock throughout the entire critical section, to protect updates
to the callback/notifier chain.
This can be achieved by writing the callback registration code as follows:
cpu_maps_update_begin(); [ or cpu_notifier_register_begin(); see below ]
for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
init_cpu(cpu);
/* This doesn't take the cpu_add_remove_lock */
__register_cpu_notifier(&foobar_cpu_notifier);
cpu_maps_update_done(); [ or cpu_notifier_register_done(); see below ]
Note that we can't use get_online_cpus() here instead of cpu_maps_update_begin()
because the cpu_hotplug.lock is dropped during the invocation of CPU_POST_DEAD
notifiers, and hence get_online_cpus() cannot provide the necessary
synchronization to protect the callback/notifier chains against concurrent
reads and writes. On the other hand, since the cpu_add_remove_lock protects
the entire hotplug operation (including CPU_POST_DEAD), we can use
cpu_maps_update_begin/done() to guarantee proper synchronization.
Also, since cpu_maps_update_begin/done() is like a super-set of
get/put_online_cpus(), the former naturally protects the critical sections
from concurrent hotplug operations.
Since the names cpu_maps_update_begin/done() don't make much sense in CPU
hotplug callback registration scenarios, we'll introduce new APIs named
cpu_notifier_register_begin/done() and map them to cpu_maps_update_begin/done().
In summary, introduce the lockless variants of un/register_cpu_notifier() and
also export the cpu_notifier_register_begin/done() APIs for use by modules.
This way, we provide a race-free way to register hotplug callbacks as well as
perform initialization for the CPUs that are already online.
Change-Id: If62c2541afb3032da62ec8e4b8049ea51dbe823d
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Git-commit: 93ae4f978ca7f26d17df915ac7afc919c1dd0353
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Signed-off-by: Osvaldo Banuelos <osvaldob@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Current upstream kernel hangs with mips and powerpc targets in
uniprocessor mode if SECCOMP is configured.
Bisect points to commit dbd952127d11 ("seccomp: introduce writer locking").
Turns out that code such as
BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(&list_lock));
can not be used in uniprocessor mode because spin_is_locked() always
returns false in this configuration, and that assert_spin_locked()
exists for that very purpose and must be used instead.
Fixes: dbd952127d11 ("seccomp: introduce writer locking")
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Applying restrictive seccomp filter programs to large or diverse
codebases often requires handling threads which may be started early in
the process lifetime (e.g., by code that is linked in). While it is
possible to apply permissive programs prior to process start up, it is
difficult to further restrict the kernel ABI to those threads after that
point.
This change adds a new seccomp syscall flag to SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER for
synchronizing thread group seccomp filters at filter installation time.
When calling seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
filter) an attempt will be made to synchronize all threads in current's
threadgroup to its new seccomp filter program. This is possible iff all
threads are using a filter that is an ancestor to the filter current is
attempting to synchronize to. NULL filters (where the task is running as
SECCOMP_MODE_NONE) are also treated as ancestors allowing threads to be
transitioned into SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER. If prctrl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,
...) has been set on the calling thread, no_new_privs will be set for
all synchronized threads too. On success, 0 is returned. On failure,
the pid of one of the failing threads will be returned and no filters
will have been applied.
The race conditions against another thread are:
- requesting TSYNC (already handled by sighand lock)
- performing a clone (already handled by sighand lock)
- changing its filter (already handled by sighand lock)
- calling exec (handled by cred_guard_mutex)
The clone case is assisted by the fact that new threads will have their
seccomp state duplicated from their parent before appearing on the tasklist.
Holding cred_guard_mutex means that seccomp filters cannot be assigned
while in the middle of another thread's exec (potentially bypassing
no_new_privs or similar). The call to de_thread() may kill threads waiting
for the mutex.
Changes across threads to the filter pointer includes a barrier.
Based on patches by Will Drewry.
Suggested-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Conflicts:
include/linux/seccomp.h
include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
This changes the mode setting helper to allow threads to change the
seccomp mode from another thread. We must maintain barriers to keep
TIF_SECCOMP synchronized with the rest of the seccomp state.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Conflicts:
kernel/seccomp.c
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Normally, task_struct.seccomp.filter is only ever read or modified by
the task that owns it (current). This property aids in fast access
during system call filtering as read access is lockless.
Updating the pointer from another task, however, opens up race
conditions. To allow cross-thread filter pointer updates, writes to the
seccomp fields are now protected by the sighand spinlock (which is shared
by all threads in the thread group). Read access remains lockless because
pointer updates themselves are atomic. However, writes (or cloning)
often entail additional checking (like maximum instruction counts)
which require locking to perform safely.
In the case of cloning threads, the child is invisible to the system
until it enters the task list. To make sure a child can't be cloned from
a thread and left in a prior state, seccomp duplication is additionally
moved under the sighand lock. Then parent and child are certain have
the same seccomp state when they exit the lock.
Based on patches by Will Drewry and David Drysdale.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Conflicts:
kernel/fork.c
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
In preparation for adding seccomp locking, move filter creation away
from where it is checked and applied. This will allow for locking where
no memory allocation is happening. The validation, filter attachment,
and seccomp mode setting can all happen under the future locks.
For extreme defensiveness, I've added a BUG_ON check for the calculated
size of the buffer allocation in case BPF_MAXINSN ever changes, which
shouldn't ever happen. The compiler should actually optimize out this
check since the test above it makes it impossible.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Conflicts:
kernel/seccomp.c
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Since seccomp transitions between threads requires updates to the
no_new_privs flag to be atomic, the flag must be part of an atomic flag
set. This moves the nnp flag into a separate task field, and introduces
accessors.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Conflicts
include/linux/sched.h
kernel/sys.c
EDIT: Sumsung/klte tree already had a few changes from the original
patch, so they are ommited/removed from here.
Change-Id: If83d4adaca8920efd278ff4e3d80a024dd079cde
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
This adds the new "seccomp" syscall with both an "operation" and "flags"
parameter for future expansion. The third argument is a pointer value,
used with the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation. Currently, flags must
be 0. This is functionally equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...).
In addition to the TSYNC flag later in this patch series, there is a
non-zero chance that this syscall could be used for configuring a fixed
argument area for seccomp-tracer-aware processes to pass syscall arguments
in the future. Hence, the use of "seccomp" not simply "seccomp_add_filter"
for this syscall. Additionally, this syscall uses operation, flags,
and user pointer for arguments because strictly passing arguments via
a user pointer would mean seccomp itself would be unable to trivially
filter the seccomp syscall itself.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
include/linux/syscalls.h
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
kernel/seccomp.c
kernel/sys_ni.c
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Separates the two mode setting paths to make things more readable with
fewer #ifdefs within function bodies.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
To support splitting mode 1 from mode 2, extract the mode checking and
assignment logic into common functions.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Konstantin Khlebnikov
Stephen Hemminger
Rusty Russell
Kees Cook
Eric W. Biederman
Arne Coucheron
David Herrmann
Zev Weiss
Linus Torvalds
K.Prasad
PythonLimited
Thomas Gleixner
Daniel Micay
Kevin F. Haggerty
Mel Gorman
Mateusz Jurczyk
Xiaocheng Li
John Stultz
Peter Zijlstra
Nick Desaulniers
Steven Rostedt (Red Hat)
Ariel Yin
Al Viro
David Howells
Andi Kleen
Mark Grondona
Srivatsa S. Bhat
Guenter Roeck
Robert Sesek